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U nder Maryland Rule 4-312(b)(3), trial judges 
have complete discretion to select 
alternate jurors for non-capital 
trials. When alternates have not 
been chosen, the Rules provide 
various remedies for replacing a 
juror who becomes, or is dis-
covered to be, disabled and must 
be removed from jury service. In 
Pollitt v. State, 344 Md. 318, 686 
A.2d 629 (1996), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that if a 
jury is impanelled without alter-
nates and a sworn juror is excused 
prior to the start of trial, a sub-
stitute juror may only be sua 
sponte appointed from the remain-
ing venire with the express consent 
of both parties. 
Following his arrest for assault 
and battery, Frederick Pollitt 
("Pollitt") elected a jury trial in the 
Circuit Court for Wicomico 
County. Expecting a short trial, 
neither the court nor the parties 
requested alternate jurors. After 
exhausting their peremptory chal-
lenges, both parties consented to 
the first twelve people in the re-
maining venire and the jury was 
sworn. Before opening statements 
had begun, however, the trial judge 
noticed that juror number one had 
difficulty hearing. With the 
parties' consent, thejudge excused 
the juror from duty. 
Pollitt believed that when the 
trial judge then asked if either 
party objected to selecting another 
juror, the judge would allow the 
parties to exercise additional per-
emptory challenges with respect to 
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the replacement juror. Since the 
potential jurors who were ap-
proved on voir dire but not 
selected remained in the court 
room, the judge decided, for the 
sake of convenience, to simply 
impanel the next person on the 
jury list as juror number one. 
After the judge ordered the 
replacement juror sworn, Pollitt 
immediately requested a bench 
conference where he moved to 
strike the new juror. The judge 
denied the motion on the grounds 
that Pollitt had exercised all of his 
strikes and additional strikes were 
only permitted for selecting 
alternate jurors, and the new juror 
was not an alternate. The trial 
progressed and the defendant was 
convicted. 
In the Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland, Pollitt presented two 
arguments. First, by refusing to 
allow additional strikes the trial 
judge denied him his right to make 
an informed and comparative 
rej ection of a potential juror. 
Second, by impanelling a sub-
stitute juror, the judge effectively 
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chose an alternate juror without 
permitting additional challenges as 
required by Maryland Rule 4-
313(a)(5). The intermediate appel-
late court affirmed the circuit court 
conviction. Pollitt petitioned the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland for 
a writ of certiorari to review the 
issues before the court of special 
appeals. 
In the court of appeals, Pollitt 
again argued that by denying 
additional peremptory challenges 
the trial judge violated his right to 
make informed and comparative 
rejections of jurors as set forth in 
Spencer v. State. Pollitt, 344 Md. 
at 322, 686 A.2d at 631 (citing 
Spencer v. State, 20 Md. App. 201, 
314 A.2d 727 (1974)). In Spencer, 
after counsel executed their strikes, 
the court clerk arbitrarily altered 
the order in which jurors were 
selected. Pollitt at 322, 686 A.2d 
at 631. Doing so thwarted defense 
counsel's strategy for having 
desirable jurors impanelled on the 
jury. Id. at 322, 686 A.2d at 631. 
After acknowledging that the jury 
selection process afforded the 
parties the right to attempt to both 
choose and reject potential jurors 
in order to obtain a favorable jury, 
the Spencer court then held that 
the clerk's act '''affirmatively mis-
led '" defense counsel and denied 
the defendant that right. Id. at 
322-23,686 A.2d at 631 (quoting 
Spencer, 20 Md. App. at 208, 314 
A.2d at 732). 
In the case at bar, Pollitt con-
tended that his right to com-
parative rejection was violated in 
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 79 
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like manner. Id at 322-23, 686 
A.2d at 631. Pollitt argued that, as 
in Spencer, his strikes were based 
upon his understanding of which 
jurors from the jury list were likely 
to become eligible for selection. 
Pollitt at 323, 686 A.2d at 631. 
The court of appeals, however, 
distinguished Spencer from the 
present case. Pollitt at 323, 686 
A.2d at 631. The court held that, 
unlike Spencer, no affirmative 
denial occurred here because no 
one could have predicted the dis-
ability of the initial juror. Pollitt at 
323, 686 A.2d at 631. 
Pollitt also argued that by 
simply choosing the next juror 
from the remaining venire, the trial 
judge effectively selected an alter-
nate juror without allowing the 
parties to exercise additional 
peremptory challenges as required 
by rule. Id. at 324, 686 A.2d at 
631-32. While the court of appeals 
did not expressly hold that the trial 
judge had selected an alternate 
juror, it nevertheless found the 
judge's novel approach logical and 
held it to be appropriate if all 
parties consent. Id. at 325, 686 
A.2d at 632. 
The court of appeals also found 
that in this circumstance, however, 
Pollitt had not consented to the sua 
sponte selection. Id at 325-26, 
686 A.2d at 632-33. Because 
Pollitt believed that he would be 
allowed additional peremptory 
challenges, his consent to calling 
the next juror was conditioned on 
his ability to challenge the replace-
ment juror with an additional 
strike as if the juror was being 
chosen as an alternate. Id at 326, 
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 80 
686 A.2d at 632-33. Finding that 
belief to be entirely reasonable in 
light of the circumstances, the 
court of appeals ruled that when 
the judge refused to allow 
additional strikes, petitioner's 
conditional consent was 
extinguished. Id at 326, 686 A.2d 
at 633. Without the parties' 
consent to sua sponte selection of 
a replacement juror or to pro-
ceeding with only eleven jurors, 
the court held that the trial judge 
"had no choice but to declare a 
mistrial." Id at 326, 686 A.2d at 
633. 
After a trial commences, 
dismissal of jurors for various 
valid reasons is not uncommon. 
Prior to Pollitt, when jurors were 
dismissed in criminal cases, courts 
could proceed in one of three 
ways: (1) if an alternate juror was 
chosen, instate the alternate juror 
as a voting juror as provided in 
Maryland Rule 4-312(b); (2) con-
clude the trial with only eleven 
jurors, with consent of the parties 
as provided in Maryland Rule 4-
311 (b); or (3) declare a mistrial as 
provided in Article 27, section 
594, of the Maryland Annotated 
Code. Pollitt, 344 Md. at 324-25, 
686 A.2d at 632. In Pollitt, the 
trial judge added, and the court of 
appeals affirmed, a fourth option 
of sua sponte selection from the 
remaining venire. 
This opinion will force 
attorneys to make another impor-
tant strategic decision on perhaps 
only a moment's notice. When a 
jury is impanelled without alter-
nates and a sworn juror is then 
dismissed, attorneys must now 
choose from among the following 
options: (1) force a mistrial by 
withholding consent both to the 
sua sponte selection and to pro-
ceeding with only eleven jurors; 
(2) proceed with only eleven 
jurors; or (3) give express consent 
to the sua sponte selection. Unfor-
tunately, with respect to the last 
option, Pollitt leaves an important 
procedural question unanswered: 
if the parties consent to replacing 
the dismissed juror, do they each 
then have the right to strike the 
person called? If so, then how 
many more strikes are available to 
the parties thereafter? If not, then 
practically speaking, this holding 
creates one additional de facto 
strike of the eleven members of the 
jury who were successfully sworn. 
